【文章标题】：good books so far this year
【文章标题】：今年迄今的好书
【文章正文】：
First books, then movie, food, theater, and bakery recs
先推书籍，再荐电影、美食、戏剧和面包店
Ancient & Classical
古代与古典
Classical Greek Tactics: A Cultural History, Roel Konijnendijk, 2018. Covered in an upcoming podcast. Fun to read a book where from the first five pages it’s clear the author has an absolute command of his sources.
《古典希腊战术：一部文化史》，罗埃尔·科宁戴克，2018年。将在后续播客中讨论。读这本书很有趣，因为开篇五页就能看出作者对史料有着绝对的掌控力。
My favorite riff was his exploration of the debate around what actually happened at the Battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas’ famous victory over Sparta in 371 BC. Prussian historians tried to make him into another Frederick the Great grand tactical genius, but the sources just don’t give you enough color to know what it was he did to win this battle, so each historian came up with their own pet theory.
我最喜欢的部分是他对留克特拉战役（公元前371年伊巴密浓达击败斯巴达的著名战役）真相争议的探讨。普鲁士历史学家试图将他塑造成另一个腓特烈大帝式的战术天才，但史料并未提供足够细节说明他如何取胜，因此每位史学家都提出了自己的偏爱理论。
Roel also squared a lot of circles by emphasizing just how corny all Greeks save Spartans thought hoplite training was. Xenophon acknowledges that Athenians “not only neglect to make themselves fit, but mock at those who take the trouble to do so.” Beyond general fitness, weapons training was practically non-existent, and all hoplites save Spartan ones couldn’t turn. This limitation limited just how creative generals could get with their tactics.
罗埃尔还通过强调”除斯巴达人外，所有希腊人都认为重装步兵训练很老套”这一观点，解决了许多矛盾。色诺芬承认雅典人”不仅忽视锻炼身体，还嘲笑那些认真训练的人”。除基础体能外，武器训练几乎不存在，且所有非斯巴达重装步兵都无法转向。这种局限限制了将领们的战术创意。
Pod with Roel here:
罗埃尔播客链接：
Side note: According to Plutarch, Epaminondas was a fat-shamer. “He hated fat men, and dismissed one of them, saying, that three or four shields would scarce serve to secure his belly, so that his belly would not let him see his own genitals.” And this was pretty hard too: “When the Argives were confederates with the Thebans, Callistratus the orator reproached the cities with Orestes and Oedipus. But Epaminondas stood up and said: ‘We confess there hath been one amongst us that killed his father, and among the Argives one that killed his mother; but we banished those that did such things, and the Athenians took them in.’”
注：据普鲁塔克记载，伊巴密浓达是个身材羞辱者。“他厌恶胖子，曾驱逐其中一人说：‘三四面盾牌都遮不住他的肚子，胖得连自己生殖器都看不见’。“还有更狠的：“当阿尔戈斯人与底比斯结盟时，演说家卡利斯特拉托斯用俄瑞斯特斯和俄狄浦斯讽刺两城。伊巴密浓达起身反驳：‘我们承认我国出过弑父者，阿尔戈斯出过弑母者；但我们将这些人流放，而雅典人却收留了他们。’”
The World of Odysseus, Moses I. Finley, 1954. The history books that still get recommended from the 1950s are some of the best I’ve ever read. This era had writers with so much confidence and style!
《奥德修斯的世界》，摩西·芬利，1954年。至今仍被推荐的1950年代历史书是我读过最棒的。那个时代的作家充满自信与风格！
*Odyssey on audiobook!
*《奥德赛》有声书推荐！
Highly recommend listening to the Clare Danes’ Emily Wilson in parallel with the Ian McKellen’s Fagles rendition. Both bring completely different energies, highlighting their respective translators’ strongsuits. Listening gives you more of a Homeric experience and reminds you how fun and plotty this text is. Compared to the Old Testament, you get much more time for characters to breathe while still benefitting from the extreme economy you get in ancient literature.
强烈建议同时聆听克莱尔·丹妮丝的艾米丽·威尔逊版与伊恩·麦克莱恩的费格勒斯版。两者风格迥异，各显译者所长。聆听能带来更浓厚的荷马史诗体验，让人想起文本的趣味性与情节性。相较《旧约》，它给角色更多喘息空间，同时保留古代文学特有的极致简练。
Some bits that stuck out to me this read through:
本次阅读中令我印象深刻的部分：
Zendaya crying at Troy’s sacking is a slightly different energy than Athena helping Odysseus make heads roll!
赞达亚为特洛伊沦陷哭泣的场景，与雅典娜帮奥德修斯大杀四方的氛围截然不同！
Side note—Claude is pretty fun to ask questions about Homer’s word choice!
注：向Claude提问荷马的选词会很有趣！
2800 years later and still no-one has out-simile’d Homer.
2800年过去了，仍无人能在明喻运用上超越荷马。
And I love the shade that Odysseus shows his son here:
我尤其喜欢奥德修斯在此处对儿子的暗讽：
Korea & the DPRK
朝鲜与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国
Korean Messiah: Kim Il Sung and the Christian Roots of North Korea’s Personality Cult, Jonathan Cheng, 2026. Covered in this podcast.
《朝鲜弥赛亚：金日成与朝鲜个人崇拜的基督教根源》，乔纳森·程，2026年。相关播客在此。
Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964, Balázs Szalontai, 2005.
《赫鲁晓夫时代的金日成：苏朝关系与朝鲜专制根源（1953-1964）》，巴拉兹·萨隆泰，2005年。
Deeply archival, it has some good lore and new perspectives on familiar political beats as it explores the question of why the DPRK got so weird while other divided communist countries like East Germany and North Vietnam didn’t grow into wacko personalist dictatorships.
基于深度档案研究，本书在探讨”为何朝鲜变得如此怪异，而东德、北越等其他分裂的共产主义国家未发展成疯狂的个人独裁政权”时，提供了珍贵史料与新视角。
His answer in brief is that it’s Kim being Kim:
他的简要答案是：这就是金日成的本性使然：
“In my view, one of the principal causes of North Korean despotism was the intense and xenophobic nationalism professed by Kim Il Sung and the former Manchurian guerrillas. Rooted in the latter’s personal experiences and reinforced by Japan’s post-1937 assimilationist policy, this nationalism greatly influenced Pyongyang’s actions toward both South Korea and the ‘communist camp.’ In turn, the goals the North Korean leadership pursued in the field of foreign policy produced a strong effect on its domestic policies. Furthermore, the excessive importance Kim Il Sung attached to direct participation in the armed revolutionary struggle against Japanese rule became a source of excessive elitism.” After Stalin’s death, the purge of the Soviet and Yan’an groups in 1957–1959 subsequently “secured Pyongyang’s political independence from Moscow once and for all.” (pp. 229, 246)
“在我看来，朝鲜专制的主因之一是金日成与前满洲游击队员所信奉的极端排外民族主义。这种源于个人经历、并被日本1937年后同化政策强化的民族主义，深刻影响了平壤对韩国和’共产主义阵营’的政策。而外交政策目标又反过来强烈作用于国内政策。此外，金日成过度重视直接参与抗日武装斗争，这催生了极端精英主义。“斯大林死后，1957-1959年对苏联派和延安派的清洗”使平壤彻底摆脱了莫斯科的政治控制”。（第229、246页）
“Kim was neither willing nor compelled to liberalize his regime. Paradoxically, he could usually count on external assistance—and actually badly needed it—yet he distrusted his aid donors, resented being dependent on their good will, and did his best to prevent them from establishing contacts with the North Korean population. His obsession with absolute control over the society was a straitjacket that inhibited the dictatorship from introducing far-reaching changes.” Ultimately, “it was the severity of repression and the extensiveness of state control over society and cultural life that primarily distingui
”金日成既不愿也未被强迫开放政权。矛盾的是，他通常能获得外部援助（实际上极度需要），却又不信任援助方，憎恨依赖他们善意的状态，并竭力阻止他们接触朝鲜民众。对社会绝对控制的执念如同紧身衣，限制着独裁政权推行深远改革。“最终，“正是镇压的残酷性及国家对社