【文章标题】：Why China’s AI Bubble Is Also Industrial Policy
【文章标题】：为什么中国的AI泡沫也是产业政策
Leia Wang is a is a nonresident scholar in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as an associate at the Centre for the Governance of AI (GovAI).
Leia Wang是卡内基国际和平基金会技术与国际事务项目的非驻地学者，同时也是人工智能治理中心（GovAI）的副研究员。
击鼓传花 (
ji gu chuan hua
), roughly translated as “beat the drum, pass the flower,” is a Chinese children’s game in which players pass a flower around while a drum sounds. When the drum stops, whoever is left holding the flower loses the round.
击鼓传花 ( ji gu chuan hua )，大致翻译为“打鼓传花”，是一种中国儿童游戏，玩者随着鼓声传递花朵。鼓声停止时，手持花朵的人输掉这一轮。
The phrase has recently acquired a secondary use in Chinese financial and policy commentary as a shorthand for a speculative chain in which risk is passed between participants. From
anonymous
investor forums
to
listed-company
risk disclosures
, it has been applied to the 2015
A-share bubble
,
property speculation
, local government
debt rollovers
,
P2P lending
, and, most recently, the
venture capital (VC) market
. As one Chinese venture capitalist explained to me,
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the game is China’s AI market, and investors are the players. Each investor races to pass along overvalued AI companies before the “beat” of the capital-raising cycle stops.
这个短语最近在中国金融和政策评论中获得了第二种用法，用来指代一种投机链条，风险在参与者之间传递。从匿名投资者论坛到上市公司风险披露，它被用于2015年的A股泡沫、房地产投机、地方政府债务滚转、P2P借贷，以及最近的风险投资（VC）市场。正如一位中国风险投资家向我解释的，
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这个游戏就是中国的AI市场，投资者是玩家。每个投资者都争相在融资周期的“鼓点”停止之前，把估值过高的AI公司传递出去。
Many domestic financial actors
caution
that this dynamic indicates China’s early-stage AI market is becoming a financial bubble. Valuations have inflated faster than revenues, capital is concentrated in a handful of hot subsectors, and money keeps flowing toward companies with no clear path to profitability. They cite the roughly
80,000
Chinese AI companies that have dissolved or deregistered in the past two years.
许多国内金融参与者警告称，这种动态表明中国的早期AI市场正在变成金融泡沫。估值膨胀的速度超过了收入增长，资本集中在少数热门子行业，资金不断流向没有明确盈利路径的公司。他们援引了过去两年中约8万家注销或退市的中国AI公司作为证据。
While they may be right that these are indicators of a market about to correct itself, it is more likely that they are signs that Chinese industrial policy is at work. Since 2017, when AI was designated a
strategic technology
, Beijing has taken an active role in
promoting the industry’s growth
. Over the past eighteen months, the state has prioritized funding early-stage companies, launching dedicated
national AI funds
and committing hundreds of billions of yuan toward AI ventures. This influx of concentrated capital has contributed to bubble-like dynamics as funding rushes in faster than the industry can absorb it.
虽然他们可能说对了，这些是市场即将自我修正的指标，但更有可能的是，这些迹象表明中国的产业政策正在发挥作用。自2017年AI被指定为战略技术以来，北京在推动行业发展方面发挥了积极作用。在过去十八个月中，国家优先资助早期公司，设立了专门的国家AI基金，并承诺向AI企业投入数千亿元人民币。这种集中资本的涌入造成了类似泡沫的动态，因为资金涌入的速度超过了行业的吸收能力。
Yet the strategy of financing new ventures in strategic sectors is one Beijing has used before. From solar panels to electric vehicles (EVs), the government used state capital to build other priority industries. Whether AI follows a similar trajectory depends on how the funding is deployed, including the mechanisms and stakeholders involved.
然而，为战略领域的新企业提供融资是北京以前使用过的策略。从太阳能电池板到电动汽车，政府利用国有资本建设其他优先产业。AI是否会遵循类似的轨迹，取决于资金的使用方式，包括所涉及的机制和利益相关者。
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The Rise of Policy-Driven Funding
政策驱动融资的兴起
The origins of the government venture funding architecture stem from the history of China’s AI financing ecosystem. Over the past decade, shifting domestic and international policies have shaped the sources of venture capital and the structure through which it is deployed.
政府风险投资架构的起源源于中国AI融资生态系统的历史。在过去十年中，国内外政策的转变塑造了风险资本的来源及其部署结构。
Before 2018, foreign venture capital played a major role in Chinese tech financing. Firms like IDG, Goldman Sachs, and Peninsula Capital
funded
the first wave of internet giants, such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. These firms brought both large-scale capital and a Western investment philosophy of high-risk, staged investment, which shaped what got funded and how within the tech startup world. However, driven by rising US-China tensions, the share of Chinese VC deal value involving foreign investors
fell
from 54.8% in 2018 to roughly 20% in 2023. President Biden’s August 2023
executive order
(EO) on outbound investment,
which
prohibited or required notification for certain US investments in Chinese AI, semiconductor, and quantum firms, accelerated this process. Although the EO didn’t take effect until January 2025, many international firms split off their China entities, downsized their domestic presence, or withdrew from China altogether in anticipation of its enforcement. Dollar-denominated funds, which accounted for nearly 14% of China VC fundraising in 2021, accounted for
barely 1%
by early 2025.
2018年之前，外国风险投资在中国科技融资中扮演了重要角色。IDG、高盛、半岛资本等公司资助了阿里巴巴、腾讯、百度等第一代互联网巨头。这些公司带来了大规模资本和西方的高风险分阶段投资理念，塑造了科技初创世界中哪些项目获得资助以及如何资助的方式。然而，由于中美紧张局势加剧，涉及外国投资者的中国风险投资交易额占比从2018年的54.8%下降到2023年的约20%。拜登总统2023年8月关于对外投资的行政命令禁止或要求通报美国对中国AI、半导体和量子公司的某些投资，加速了这一进程。尽管该行政命令直到2025年1月才生效，但许多国际公司预计其执行，已分拆中国实体、缩减在华业务或完全撤出中国。美元计价基金在2021年占中国VC募资的近14%，到2025年初仅占约1%。
Domestically, private capital actors were in no position to fill the gap. As foreign funding retreated, a wave of new regulations hit the Chinese tech sector, stymying the industry’s main sources of funding and exit avenues. The 2018
asset management rules
restricted the underlying wealth management structures that supplied the largest source of domestic private funding. This was exacerbated by Beijing’s 2021
tech crackdown
, beginning with regulators fining Alibaba a record
18.2 billion yuan
($2.8 billion) for anticompetitive behavior. The campaign subsequently swept up Tencent, Meituan, and many of the other Chinese consumer internet champions. Beijing then launched a
cybersecurity probe
into ride-hailing giant DiDi as it pursued a New York IPO, leading regulators to pull Didi apps from app stores and forcing the company to delist. On the US side, the
Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act
threatened to delist Chinese companies due to disputes over auditing standards. This made US listings, once the clear objective of most startups, no longer a viable option. By 2024, venture capital fundraising sank to its lowest level
in almost a decade
.
在国内，私人资本参与者无法填补这一空缺。随着外国资金撤退，一波新法规冲击了中国科技行业，阻碍了该行业的主要融资来源和退出途径。2018年的资产管理规则限制了提供国内私人资金最大来源的底层财富管理结构。北京2021年的科技整顿加剧了这一情况，首先是监管机构对阿里巴巴处以创纪录的182亿元人民币（28亿美元）反竞争行为罚款。随后，该行动波及腾讯、美团等众多中国消费互联网巨头。北京随后对在纽约IPO的网约车巨头滴滴发起网络安全审查，导致监管机构将滴滴应用从应用商店下架，并迫使该公司退市。在美国方面，《外国公司问责法案》因审计标准争议威胁将中国公司摘牌。这使得曾经是大多数初创公司明确目标的美国上市不再可行。到2024年，风险投资募资降至近十年来的最低水平。
With the retreat of private funding, state capital came to dominate early-stage funding.
The same year private VC was at its lowest, state-owned capital accounted for
82%
of all new LP contributions. Since then, state funding has continued to pour into the venture capital ecosystem, especially within AI. As AI has grown in importance, the government has expanded its breadth of funding to various stages and types of AI companies, with state investors leading some of the sector’s
largest financing rounds
.
随着私人资金撤退，国有资本开始主导早期融资。
就在私人VC处于低谷的同一年，国有资本占所有新增LP出资的82%。此后，国家资金持续涌入风险投资生态系统，尤其是在AI领域。随着AI重要性日益提升，政府已将融资范围扩大到各类阶段和类型的AI公司，国家投资者主导了该行业一些最大的融资轮次。
Government Funding’s Role in the AI Industry
政府资金在AI行业中的作用
As Beijing increases its investment in the AI industry, government priorities and funding mechanisms are playing a large role in shaping the industry. The set of stakeholders involved in the government financing apparatus, the terms attached to the funding, and how this money is directed and allocated now disproportionately determine what gets built.
随着北京加大对AI产业的投资，政府的优先事项和融资机制在塑造行业方面发挥着重要作用。政府融资机制所涉及的利益相关者、资金附带的条件以及资金的使用和分配方式，现在不成比例地决定了建设什么。
Currently, much of this capital has been deployed via government guidance funds (GGFs), vehicles set up to
channel state capital
in line with industrial goals, including promoting “
strategic emerging technologies
” (战略性新兴产业
zhan lue xing xin xing chan ye
), advancing
industrial upgrading
, and reducing
reliance on foreign suppliers
in critical sectors. GGFs have played a crucial role in incubating “leapfrog technologies” such as EVs and renewables, 5G and telecom, and now, semiconductors and AI. Over the past two decades, GGFs have amassed
7.7 trillion yuan
($1.1 trillion) in committed capital,
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roughly twenty times what the US government’s public-private investment program, the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC), held at its
record 2025 high
, and enough to fund DARPA at its
current budget
for two centuries.
目前，这些资本大部分通过政府引导基金（GGF）部署，这些基金是为引导国家资本与产业目标一致而设立的，包括促进“战略性新兴产业”（战略性新兴产业），推动产业升级，以及减少关键领域对外国供应商的依赖。GGF在培育“跨越式技术”方面发挥了关键作用，如电动汽车和可再生能源、5G和电信，以及现在的半导体和AI。过去二十年中，GGF累计承诺资本达7.7万亿元人民币（1.1万亿美元），
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大约是美国政府公私投资计划小企业投资公司（SBIC）在2025年创纪录高位时所持资金的二十倍，足以按当前预算资助DARPA两个世纪。
Between 2000 and 2023, nearly
a quarter
of GGF capital flowed to AI-related firms. Within the AI supply chain, the
National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund
(the “Big Fund”)
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has been instrumental in shaping the semiconductor industry. Its first 138.7 billion yuan ($21.8 billion)
anchored
national champions along the chip-making supply chain from downstream chipmakers like foundry leader SMIC and memory maker YMTC to upstream equipment and materials suppliers like NAURA and Piotech. The fund was renewed several times, first in 2019 with
204 billion yuan
($29 billion) after China’s AlphaGo moment, and again in 2024 with
344 billion yuan
($47.5 billion) after ChatGPT’s launch to further increase AI chip and chipmaking equipment production.
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2000年至2023年间，近四分之一的GGF资本流向了AI相关企业。在AI供应链中，国家集成电路产业投资基金（“大基金”）
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在塑造半导体行业方面发挥了重要作用。其第一期1387亿元人民币（218亿美元）锚定了芯片制造供应链上的国家冠军企业，从下游芯片制造商如代工龙头中芯国际和存储制造商长江存储，到上游设备和材料供应商如北方华创和拓荆科技。该基金多次续期，第一次在2019年，即中国的AlphaGo时刻之后，规模为2040亿元人民币（290亿美元）；第二次在2024年，即ChatGPT发布之后，规模为3440亿元人民币（475亿美元），以进一步提高AI芯片和芯片制造设备的生产。
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Chinese government spending was further accelerated by US attempts to curb the industry. In January 2025, days after Washington tightened semiconductor export controls, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) established
a dedicated 60 billion yuan ($8.2 billion) National AI Industry Investment Fund.
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Unlike the Big Fund, this fund explicitly targeted early-stage ventures across the AI supply chain from upstream inputs, such as compute and data, to downstream applications, especially within embodied intelligence and autonomous vehicles.
美国遏制该行业的企图进一步加速了中国政府的支出。2025年1月，华盛顿收紧半导体出口管制几天后，工业和信息化部（MIIT）和财政部（MOF）设立了一只专门的600亿元人民币（82亿美元）国家人工智能产业投资基金。
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与大基金不同，该基金明确针对AI供应链上的早期企业，从上游投入（如算力和数据）到下游应用，尤其是具身智能和自动驾驶领域。
Less than a year later, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOF
launched
another 100 billion yuan ($14 billion) national venture capital guidance fund. This fund set up three
regional sub-funds
(Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and the Greater Bay Area) as innovation centers registered at roughly
30 to 47 billion yuan
(6.9 billion) each. Since their launch, the sub-funds have signed over 25 deals across integrated circuits, quantum, biopharma, AI, and other priority sectors.
不到一年后，国家发展和改革委员会（NDRC）和财政部又推出了一只1000亿元人民币（140亿美元）的国家风险投资引导基金。该基金设立了三个区域子基金（京津冀、长三角和粤港澳大湾区），作为创新中心，每个子基金注册规模约为300至470亿元人民币（44亿至69亿美元）。自成立以来，这些子基金已在集成电路、量子、生物医药、AI和其他优先领域签署了超过25笔交易。
GGFs have been
criticized
for creating the bubble dynamics experienced by industry and being “poorly conceived and implemented.” In some ways, this is true. Yet the dynamics that look like a financial bubble at a surface level are the same mechanisms that allow Beijing to achieve its industrial policy goals.
GGF因造成行业经历的泡沫动态以及“设计和实施不善”而受到批评。在某些方面，这是事实。然而，表面上看像金融泡沫的动态，正是让北京实现其产业政策目标的机制。
Not-so-patient Capital
不那么耐心的资本
Early-stage companies, especially in capital-intensive fields like semiconductors, robotics, and foundation models, often require years of research and capital before they turn a profit. GGFs are meant to supply this source of “patient capital”
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within hard technology sectors (硬科技
ying ke ji
). While these funds nominally have
15 to 20 year
time horizons, in practice, their effective horizons are usually much shorter.
早期公司，尤其是在半导体、机器人和基础模型等资本密集型领域的公司，往往需要多年的研究和资金才能盈利。GGF旨在为硬科技领域（硬科技）提供这种“耐心资本”来源。
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虽然这些基金名义上有15至20年的时间跨度，但实际上，它们的有效期限通常要短得多。
This timeline compression is driven by the process through which GGFs are often deployed. National GGF managers rarely invest directly. Instead, they often
delegate decision-making downward
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to various regional levels and/or private VCs to bring in industry expertise and “amplify the
leveraging effect
” of government capital. Central capital is thus passed through a chain of investors before reaching companies. The 2025 fund, for example, operates through a three-tier structure where the national
guidance fund company
seeds regional funds, which in turn seed sub-funds typically run by private VCs.
这种时间线的压缩是由GGF通常部署的过程驱动的。国家GGF管理者很少直接投资。相反，他们通常将决策权下放
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给各级地区和/或私人VC，以引入行业专业知识并“放大政府资本的杠杆效应”。因此，中央资本在到达公司之前，经过一系列投资者传递。例如，2025年的基金通过三层结构运作：国家引导基金公司种子区域基金，区域基金再种子通常由私人VC运营的子基金。
As capital flows through the system, each actor attaches their own, often short-term, objectives. Local officials, among the most active stakeholders in this process, operate on
cadre rotation cycles
(干部交流
gan bu jiao liu
), in which they switch departments and geographic posts every three to five years. They therefore optimize their funding decisions to meet their
promotion targets
within that time frame, prioritizing investments that can demonstrate measurable progress by the time they are up for review. One popular condition among officials is a geographic
reinvestment requirement
(返投
fan tou
), which mandates that companies bring capital back to the local economy in some form. To hit these targets, companies often trade off investing in longer-term ambitions for resourcing tangible short-term projects.
随着资本流经系统，每个参与者都附加了自己的、通常是短期的目标。在这一过程中最活跃的利益相关者——地方官员，按照干部交流周期（干部交流）运作，他们每三到五年更换部门和地区岗位。因此，他们优化自己的资金决策，以在该时间框架内实现晋升目标，优先投资于在考核时能够显示可衡量进展的项目。官员中一个流行的条件是地理返投要求（返投），要求公司以某种形式将资本带回当地经济。为了达到这些目标，公司往往牺牲长期目标，转而投入资源于切实的短期项目