$12B of US ratepayers' money wasted on a modeling mistake an_全翻译

$12B of US ratepayers’ money wasted on a modeling mistake and PJM wants to do it again

美国电力用户120亿美元因建模错误被浪费，PJM却想重蹈覆辙

Earlier this year, we explained why residents of the PJM area, America’s largest electricity market, have seen their power bills rise by ~20%. We argued that the main culprit was PJM’s auction design choices and how PJM models demand and supply.

今年早些时候，我们解释了为什么PJM地区（美国最大电力市场）的居民电费上涨了约20%。我们认为，罪魁祸首是PJM的拍卖设计选择及其对需求和供应的建模方式。

To better understand the extent of the problem, our Energy Model team spent the last 6 months reverse-engineering PJM’s main system model, the ‘Reserve Requirement Study’, which to date has been a black box. This study is how PJM decides what type of and how many power plants to buy to make sure electricity is reliable, using an annual auction, and spending billions each year.

为了更深入地了解问题的严重程度，我们的能源模型团队花了6个月时间对PJM的核心系统模型——“备用需求研究”（Reserve Requirement Study）进行了逆向工程，该模型至今仍是一个黑匣子。PJM通过这项研究，利用年度拍卖来决定购买何种类型、多少数量的发电厂，以确保电力可靠供应，每年花费数十亿美元。

Armed with a reconstructed model we argue that the problem is worse than we thought. PJM’s model includes errors that we estimate have cost all of its 66 million residents a total of $12B between 2025 and 2027 alone. We share our method in the annex of this newsletter for our subscribers; as well as the results of the model in our PJM Model dashboard. Our live rebuild of the Reserve Requirement Model is a tab available exclusively to our Energy Model clients; which also includes a quarter-by-quarter forecast of the whole US grid tracking >40,000 grid-connected power plants, and every single behind-the-meter datacenter power order.

有了重建的模型，我们认为问题比我们想象的更严重。PJM的模型存在错误，我们估计仅2025年至2027年间，就导致其6600万居民总共损失了120亿美元。我们在本通讯的附录中与订阅者分享了我们的方法；以及我们PJM模型仪表板中的模型结果。我们实时重建的备用需求模型是专供能源模型客户使用的标签页；其中还包含对整个美国电网的逐季度预测，追踪超过40,000座并网发电厂，以及每一个表后数据中心电力订单。

PJM’s model is structurally anti-growth with a poorly designed capacity market that is globally unique and a governance system that is too big to function.

PJM的模型在结构上反对增长，其容量市场设计糟糕，在全球独一无二，而治理体系则过于臃肿而无法运作。

These failings magnify the negative impact of bad system modeling, which is the focus of this report:

这些缺陷放大了糟糕系统建模的负面影响，而这正是本报告的重点：

• PJM underestimates by ~4 gigawatts the existing power plants it already has; owing to a methodology which doesn’t account for the higher efficiency of power plants in winter and improved power plant resilience since Storm Elliott.

• PJM 低估了约4吉瓦 其已有的现有发电厂容量；原因是其方法论未考虑冬季发电厂效率更高以及自风暴埃利奥特以来发电厂韧性的提升。

• PJM has wasted ~$12 billion of ratepayers’ money from 2025 to 2027 due to this weak methodology, which dramatically overstated the supply/demand shortfall it faced. Household electricity bills would have risen much less if PJM’s model was accurate.

• 由于这种薄弱的方法论，PJM在2025年至2027年间浪费了约120亿美元的电力用户资金，这严重夸大了其面临的供需缺口。如果PJM的模型准确，家庭电费的涨幅会小得多。

• PJM’s emergency auction is putting ratepayers at risk by signing contracts for too much power without committed counter-parties.

• PJM的紧急拍卖将电力用户置于风险之中，因为它在没有承诺交易对手的情况下签署了过多电力的合同。

Sources: SemiAnalysis Energy Model; SemiAnalysis PJM Model

来源： SemiAnalysis能源模型； SemiAnalysis PJM模型

Using PJM’s demand and supply curves we calculate that better modeling would have resulted in $6.7Bofsavingswithonly0.014GW(yes,14MW)lesspowerprocuredfor2025/26;then$4.9B and 0.8GW for 2026/27. More power meaning less in savings might be counter-intuitive but we have the supply and demand curves to show how these disproportionate impacts occur. PJM has forced itself into operating at the limit, so inaccurately modeling power plants’ capacities has a massive impact on auction costs.

利用PJM的需求和供应曲线，我们计算出，更好的建模本可以在2025/26年仅少采购0.014GW（是的，14兆瓦）电力的情况下节省67亿美元；而2026/27年则可节省49亿美元并减少0.8GW。更多的电力意味着更少的节省，这似乎有违直觉，但我们可以用供需曲线来展示这些不成比例的影响是如何产生的。PJM将自己逼到了极限运行，因此对发电厂容量的不准确建模对拍卖成本产生了巨大影响。

PJM has constrained its own supply of new power by having one-year contracts that start too soon after they are signed, as well as being slow to connect these new plants to the grid. This means fulfilling any demand growth requires paying a big premium for new power plants to be built at unrealistic speeds. PJM also runs the only capacity market in the world that does not distinguish between new and existing power plants. So that premium paid for new power plants is also paid to existing power plants for doing nothing. The same growth in a market that splits new and existing power plant auctions avoids the volume effect of repricing the entire fleet; which means ratepayers are better protected from price spikes.

PJM通过签订一年期合同（合同签署后过早开始）以及并网速度缓慢，限制了自己新电力的供应。这意味着要满足任何需求增长，就必须支付高额溢价，让新电厂以不现实的速度建成。PJM还运营着世界上唯一一个不区分新电厂和现有电厂的容量市场。因此，为新电厂支付的溢价也会被支付给无所事事的现有电厂。在一个将新电厂和现有电厂拍卖分开的市场中，同样的增长可以避免对整个发电机组重新定价的体量效应；这意味着电力用户能更好地免受价格飙升的影响。

Despite four record-breaking auctions costing $63B,PJMwillbeshortoftheamountofgenerationitneedstorunreliably,andplanstorunan“emergencyauction”fromSeptember30thtoOctober21stwithresultsbyDecember2nd.SemiAnalysisconcludesthereisanadditional3.8GWofreliablepoweronPJM’ssystembytakingintoaccountincreasedturbineefficiencyfromcoldair,andreducedriskofwinterfailureafterfederallymandatedassetwinterizationinvestments.Thisistheequivalentofeightlargegaspowerplantswhichwouldcostaround[$10 billion to build today](/articles/the-price-of-power). This 3.8GW would negate 56% of the 6.8GW that PJM plans to procure in its emergency auction.

尽管四次创纪录的拍卖耗资630亿美元，PJM仍将面临可靠运行所需发电量的短缺，并计划于9月30日至10月21日举行“紧急拍卖”，结果将于12月2日公布。SemiAnalysis得出结论，考虑到冷空气带来的涡轮效率提升，以及联邦强制资产过冬投资后冬季故障风险的降低，PJM系统上还有额外的3.8GW可靠电力。这相当于八座大型燃气发电厂，如今建造这些电厂的成本约为100亿美元。这3.8GW将抵消PJM计划在紧急拍卖中采购的6.8GW的56%。

PJM’s emergency auction presents serious risks, it will sign contracts running to 2043 that are supposed to be paid for by new large loads. These are not sales of electricity; the plants get paid just for existing, whether or not the forecast demand ever arrives. But PJM is doing this with no committed counter-parties. PJM does not have its own money, everything it spends is from ratepayers.

PJM的紧急拍卖带来了严重风险，它将签署持续到2043年的合同，而这些合同本应由新增大型负荷支付。这些不是电力销售；电厂只要存在就能获得报酬，无论预测的需求是否真的到来。但PJM在没有承诺交易对手的情况下这样做。PJM没有自己的资金，它花费的一切都来自电力用户。

Every PJM state will have to pass (but none have done so yet) their own cost-allocation policy to pass on costs to participating new large loads. But those large loads can opt out if they contract their own additional power plants directly. If they participate there is little clarity on how much of the auction’s capacity they are expected to pay for. Participation brings no other benefits, like accelerated interconnection timelines. Many datacenter developers have written off PJM regardless, going elsewhere or planning behind-the-meter power configurations. If no other counter-party emerges, then once again those left holding the bag will be the residential ratepayers.

PJM所在的每个州都必须通过（但至今没有一个州这样做）各自的成本分摊政策，将成本转嫁给参与的新增大型负荷。但如果这些大型负荷直接签约自己的额外电厂，它们可以选择退出。如果它们参与，对于它们需要支付拍卖容量的多少，几乎没有明确说明。参与不会带来其他好处，比如加快并网时间表。许多数据中心开发商已经不考虑PJM了，转而选择其他地方或计划表后电力配置。如果没有其他交易对手出现，那么再次承担损失的将是居民电力用户。

Sources: SemiAnalysis Energy Model; SemiAnalysis PJM Model

来源： SemiAnalysis能源模型； SemiAnalysis PJM模型

In this report, we dive into PJM’s capacity market and introduce our proprietary reverse-engineered model. We believe that PJM fails to accurately model two critical supply characteristics, despite key stakeholders recognizing them to be both real and of importance:

在本报告中，我们深入探讨PJM的容量市场，并介绍我们专有的逆向工程模型。我们认为，尽管关键利益相关者承认以下两个关键供应特性是真实且重要的，但PJM未能准确对其建模：

• PJM does not credit how cold, dense air makes gas plants stronger electricity generators by up to 25% in winter; and

• PJM没有计入冷而密的空气在冬季使燃气电厂发电能力提高多达25%的事实；以及

• PJM’s risk calculations have not been updated to recognize that as long ago as 2024, 400 of PJM’s ~700 gas plants had invested in winter reliability measures in response to the outages from Storm Elliott.

• PJM的风险计算尚未更新，未认识到早在2024年，PJM约700座燃气电厂中已有400座投资于冬季可靠性措施，以应对风暴埃利奥特造成的停电。

There are deeper problems at PJM than just modeling. Its current auctions were designed two decades ago, and it has not experienced demand growth since. Today PJM is structurally anti-growth. PJM is failing to adapt to this new era of load growth because of a governance deadlock, a vetocracy of vested interests. If it cannot achieve market reform perhaps it can stem the ratepayer bleeding by improving how capacity is modeled, especially when winter is coming.

PJM的问题不仅仅是建模，还有更深层次的问题。其当前的拍卖设计于二十年前，此后未经历过需求增长。如今，PJM在结构上反对增长。由于治理僵局，即既得利益的“否决政治”，PJM未能适应这个负荷增长的新时代。如果无法实现市场改革，也许它可以通过改进容量建模方式来阻止电力用户的资金流失，尤其是在冬季即将来临之际。

This report will dig deep into PJM’s capacity market. After providing some introductory context, we adopt the following structure:

本报告将深入剖析PJM的容量市场。在提供一些介绍性背景之后，我们采用以下结构：

• We start with the fundamentals and explain how PJM models supply, demand, and reliability risks. We cover their major modeling methodology change in 2024 from EFORd to Reserve Requirement Study and the implications of that change.

• 我们从基本原理开始，解释PJM如何对供应、需求和可靠性风险进行建模。我们介绍2024年他们从EFORd到备用需求研究的重大建模方法变更及其影响。

• We introduce our reverse-engineered model and cover in greater depth how we calculate the role of various resources, outages, reliability, and fleet size.

• 我们介绍逆向工程模型，并更深入地说明我们如何计算各种资源、停电、可靠性和发电机组规模的作用。

• We get to the core issue: PJM’s lack of consideration of the increased throughput of gas power plants in the winter, and their improved reliability through Asset Winterization.

• 我们触及核心问题：PJM未考虑燃气电厂在冬季吞吐量的增加，以及通过资产过冬改造提高的可靠性。

• We then dive into the pricing impact. PJM’s capacity auctions are highly complex and we explain why and how PJM’s 66M residents’ electricity bills were $12B higher than they needed to be.

• 然后我们深入探讨定价影响。PJM的容量拍卖非常复杂，我们解释为什么以及如何导致PJM的6600万居民的电费比应有的高出120亿美元。

• Lastly, we provide some thoughts on the future of PJM and its upcoming Reliability Backstop Auction. This is an emergency mechanism hoping for datacenters to pay for their own capacity. We believe that ratepayers could, again, be at risk.

• 最后，我们对PJM的未来及其即将到来的可靠性备用拍卖提供一些看法。这是一种紧急机制，希望数据中心为自己的容量付费。我们认为，电力用户可能再次面临风险。

Let’s go.

让我们开始吧。

This report is a collaboration between SemiAnalysis and Nathan Iyer in his personal capacity.

本报告是SemiAnalysis与Nathan Iyer以个人身份合作的成果。

Context

背景

If you have not been following along, let us catch you up:

如果你之前没有关注，让我们为你补上进度：

• Power bills in PJM states jumped 17-24% in June 2025, and the state regulators labeled the capacity auction as the main driver. Read our PJM vs ERCOT article to understand PJM’s capacity auction, and how singular it is relative to other energy markets.

• 2025年6月，PJM各州的电费上涨了17%至24%，州监管机构将容量拍卖列为主要驱动因素。阅读我们的PJM与ERCOT文章，了解PJM的容量拍卖及其相对于其他能源市场的独特性。

• PJM constrains its own supply of new power plants by requiring them to be built unrealistically quickly and not even accelerating the grid connections of critical projects. This constrained supply greatly increases prices in the auction.

• PJM限制自身新电厂供应，要求它们以不现实的速度建成，甚至不加速关键项目的并网。这种受限的供应大大推高了拍卖价格。

• PJM’s capacity auctions restarted in July 2024 after extended delays. This cut the lead time for new generation to get built from the intended 36 months (per the Independent Market Monitor) to 10 months, rising to only 23 months for the latest auction. Power plants take time to build and need long term visibility so giving only a 23-month lead time makes it near impossible to build new generation.

• PJM的容量拍卖在长时间延迟后于2024年7月重启。这将新发电设施的建设提前期从预期的36个月（根据独立市场监测机构）缩短到10个月，最新拍卖也仅增加到23个月。电厂建设需要时间，且需要长期可见性，因此只有23个月的提前期使得新建发电几乎不可能。

• The four auctions since have each procured 134-138GW a year of accredited capacity at prices that jumped from $28.92beforethedelayto$270-333 per megawatt-day, raising the cost of a capacity auction from $2.2Bto$16.4B, and the four-auction total to $63.6B.

• 此后的四次拍卖每年都采购了134-138GW的认证容量，价格从延迟前的每兆瓦日28.92美元跃升至270-333美元，将容量拍卖成本从22亿美元提高到164亿美元，四次拍卖总额达到636亿美元。

• This money is paid by every single household and business in the PJM area, and is little more than a transfer from ratepayers to existing power plants as over the last four auctions only 4.8GW of new capacity has been procured.

• 这笔钱由PJM地区的每个家庭和企业支付，这不过是从电力用户向现有电厂的转移，因为在过去四次拍卖中，仅采购了4.8GW的新增容量。

• Already built capacity does not need $325/MW-day:PJM’sownmarketmonitorsaysexistinggeneratorsbidat$8-14/MW-day, and Great Britain’s latest auction paid existing generation $18/MW-day (£5/kW-year).

• 已建成的容量并不需要325美元/兆瓦日：PJM自己的市场监测机构表示，现有发电机的报价为8-14美元/兆瓦日，而英国最新拍卖支付给现有发电的价格为18美元/兆瓦日（5英镑/千瓦年）。

• These gas plants do not need the money to stay online. The median existing combined cycle made 407% of its going-forward costs in the energy and ancillary services markets alone in 2025, before a dollar of capacity revenue.

• 这些燃气电厂并不需要这笔钱来维持运营。2025年，中位现有联合循环电厂仅在能源和辅助服务市场就赚取了其未来成本的407%，而这还不包括任何容量收入。

• PJM prevented new projects from getting a grid connection. From October 2021 there was no study path while PJM cleared its backlog; a general application window did not reopen until April 2026, when 220 GW applied.

• PJM阻止了新项目获得并网。自2021年10月起，在PJM清理其[积压