【文章标题】：All You Need To Know About Warsh
【文章标题】：关于沃什，你需要知道的一切
Hi, this is Alf - welcome back to The Macro Compass!
嗨，我是阿尔夫——欢迎回到宏观指南针！
Warsh is the new Fed Chair.
沃什是新任美联储主席。
I find it hilarious that people are calling him a hawk based on what he did 10-15 years ago. This is like looking at old pics of me with a head full of hair (still have one of these on LinkedIn!). These times are long gone.
我觉得人们根据他10到15年前的所作所为称他为鹰派，这很搞笑。这就像看我以前满头秀发的旧照片（LinkedIn上还挂着一张呢！）。那些日子早已一去不复返了。
Jokes aside, I spent hours listening to the most recent interviews Warsh did (here and here, for example).
玩笑归玩笑，我花了好几个小时听了沃什最近的采访（例如，此处和此处）。
Here are the most consequential thoughts he shared:
以下是他分享的最重要的观点：
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Inflation is a choice, money creation drives it (as per Friedman, and that’s true in most cases);
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通胀是一种选择，货币创造推动通胀（正如弗里德曼所言，而且在大多数情况下确实如此）；
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Fed is backstop for banking system, but needs to get out when job is done (fair);
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美联储是银行系统的后盾，但在任务完成后需要退出（有道理）；
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He believes inflationary money is created equally by Fed and the government (absolutely false: fiscal deficits create inflationary money, Fed monetary operations such as QE only create bank reserves);
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他认为通胀性货币由美联储和政府共同创造（绝对错误：财政赤字创造通胀性货币，美联储的货币政策操作如量化宽松只创造银行准备金）；
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He believes the Fed balance sheet being so big ”crowds out the private sector” (absolutely false: the private sector uses another form of money i.e. bank deposits, there is no ”crowding out” of anything);
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他认为美联储资产负债表如此庞大“挤出了私营部门”（绝对错误：私营部门使用另一种形式的货币，即银行存款，不存在任何“挤出”效应）；
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Need to get out of the ”fiscal and monetary” mess inherited: a lot of talk about interest expense > defense spending (ok, so hear the plan now…);
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需要摆脱继承下来的“财政和货币”乱局：大量谈论利息支出大于国防支出（好吧，现在听听计划……）；
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”If we would run the printing press a little quieter, we would have lower interest rates”;
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“如果我们让印钞机运转得安静一点，我们就能拥有更低的利率”；
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The plan is to shrink the Fed balance sheet, so we get lower rates, so private sector can thrive = higher economic growth (he is looking at the wrong printing press – Bessent has the key one, not the Fed);
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计划是缩减美联储资产负债表，这样我们就能获得更低的利率，私营部门就能蓬勃发展 = 更高的经济增长（他盯错了印钞机——贝森特握有那把关键的印钞机，而不是美联储）；
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Rates should also be lower because we are on the verge of a productivity boom (his opinion, fair enough);
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利率还应该更低，因为我们正处于生产力繁荣的边缘（他的观点，有道理）；
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The Fed should not be data dependent, data is revised all the time, why be? Best to have an opinion and stick to it. Also the Fed should not share economic forecasts, no dots. No forward guidance (uncertainty up).
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美联储不应依赖数据，数据一直在被修正，何必依赖？最好有一个观点并坚持下去。此外，美联储不应分享经济预测，没有点阵图。没有前瞻性指引（不确定性上升）。
It’s pretty clear Warsh – as many others, by the way – gets money creation wrong. But it still leads to some key consequences for markets:
很明显，沃什——顺便说一句，和许多其他人一样——对货币创造的理解是错误的。但这仍然会导致一些对市场至关重要的后果：
Shrinking the balance sheet and following the AI productivity fairytale will be two convenient covers Warsh will use to push for cutting Fed Funds further;
缩减资产负债表和追随人工智能生产力童话，将是沃什用来推动进一步降息的两个便利借口；
Cutting front-end rates further will help the US Dollar remain weak;
进一步降低前端利率将有助于美元保持弱势；
Injecting instability in the repo market through a reduction of the balance sheet, cutting front-end rates proactively and slashing forward guidance tools = uncertainty up = steeper curves.
通过缩减资产负债表向回购市场注入不稳定因素、主动降低前端利率以及大幅削减前瞻性指引工具 = 不确定性上升 = 收益率曲线更陡峭。
One key thing to consider is that if Warsh would manage to shrink the Fed balance sheet, this could have an impact on the repo market.
需要考虑的一个关键问题是，如果沃什成功缩减美联储资产负债表，这可能会对回购市场产生影响。
The chart below shows how bank reserves as % of total US nominal GDP have been shrinking and approaching the potentially dangerous 8-9% level – last time it breached that, we had a repo blowup in 2019.
下图显示了银行准备金占美国名义GDP总量的百分比一直在萎缩，并接近可能危险的8-9%水平——上一次突破这一水平时，我们在2019年遭遇了回购市场爆发。
This is because bank reserves are very unevenly distributed across US banks, and once they start becoming scarce the odds of interbank liquidity drying up for smaller banks increase:
这是因为银行准备金在美国各银行之间的分布非常不均，一旦它们开始变得稀缺，小型银行间流动性枯竭的可能性就会增加：
Do you know who put forward this ratio, by the way?
顺便问一下，你知道是谁提出这个比率的吗？
Waller! (Read his speech here).
沃勒！（在此处阅读他的演讲）。
Shrinking the balance sheet further here would put the stability of the repo market at risk, and by the way in December 2025 the Fed resumed purchases of T-Bills with the very intent to avoid such risks (here).
在此进一步缩减资产负债表将使回购市场的稳定面临风险，而且顺便说一句，2025年12月美联储恢复了购买短期国债，正是为了避免此类风险（此处）。
The odds of Warsh convincing his colleagues to shrink the balance sheet further here are low.
沃什说服同僚在此进一步缩减资产负债表的可能性很低。
But now let’s assume that Warsh still manages to put through his lower balance sheet + AI productivity fairytale to convince his colleagues to cut rates a bit faster. And that forward guidance disappears.
但现在让我们假设沃什仍然设法推行他的“更小资产负债表 + 人工智能生产力童话”，以说服同僚更快地降息。而且前瞻性指引消失了。
Then the US yield curve would steepen, and that goes against what the US administration wants:
那么美国收益率曲线将变得更陡峭，这与美国政府的愿望背道而驰：
Wait, why am I showing you a chart of 30-year JGBs against 30-year US yields for Japanese investors?
等等，我为什么要给你们看一张针对日本投资者的30年期日本国债与30年期美国国债收益率的图表？
Because this is a key chart for Bessent to push in the right direction, as it would achieve a great deal of positive outcomes for the US administration.
因为这是贝森特推动正确方向的关键图表，因为它将为美国政府带来大量积极成果。
For years, Japanese investors have bought foreign bonds WITHOUT hedging the FX risk at all - and why?
多年来，日本投资者购买外国债券时完全没有对冲外汇风险——为什么呢？
Because the assumption was that the Yen was going to get weaker, and hence Japanese investors could:
因为假设是日元会走弱，因此日本投资者可以：
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Get a higher yield in foreign bond markets;
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在外国债券市场获得更高的收益率；
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Benefit from the JPY weakness on top.
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此外还能从日元疲软中获益。
And it’s in the clear interest of the US administration to reverse this mechanism.
而逆转这一机制显然符合美国政府的利益。
Getting Japanese investors to buy more JGBs would encourage repatriation of capital and help JPY appreciate, plus support the Japanese bond market and help global long-end bond yields stabilize.
让日本投资者购买更多日本国债将鼓励资本回流，有助于日元升值，同时支撑日本债券市场，并帮助全球长端债券收益率企稳。
Very soon, it might be that Japanese investors wouldn’t really have any advantage in buying 30-year US Treasuries (after FX hedging costs) rather than keeping money in Japanese bonds.
很快，日本投资者在购买30年期美国国债（扣除外汇对冲成本后）与将资金留在日本债券之间，可能真的不再有任何优势可言。
A steeper US curve would bring Japanese investors into the old habits, and that’s not what the US wants.
更陡峭的美国收益率曲线会让日本投资者回到旧习惯，而这并不是美国想要的。
So, here we are trying to solve the puzzle.
所以，我们现在要尝试解开这个谜题。
We have Warsh likely using Fed balance sheet reductions and the AI productivity story to cut rates.
我们有沃什，他可能会利用美联储资产负债表缩减和人工智能生产力叙事来降息。
Unlikely to really succeed, but the bias will be for a dovish Fed (what a surprise!).
不太可能真正成功，但美联储的倾向将是鸽派的（真是令人惊讶！）。
That helps the USD to weaken and equities to go up (two clear US admin objectives), but Warsh is a curve steepener – and if long-end bonds get out of hand, Bessent and Japan could be ready to intervene.
这有助于美元走弱和股市上涨（两个明确的美国政府目标），但沃什是一个曲线陡峭化推动者——如果长端债券失控，贝森特和日本可能准备好干预。
Bessent can tweak issuance further to the front-end, and Japan can backstop its own long-end bonds too.
贝森特可以进一步将发行调整到前端，日本也可以支撑自己的长端债券。
This leaves us in a scenario where in the medium term:
这让我们处于这样一种情景，即中期内：
We keep running the global economies hot via major fiscal spending programs worldwide;
我们通过全球范围内的大规模财政支出计划让各经济体保持过热；
The Fed maintains a dovish inclination;
美联储保持鸽派倾向；
Bond yields are flat or down;
债券收益率持平或下行；
The USD trades flat or down;
美元持平或走弱；
Commodities and equities maintain the most upside convexity
大宗商品和股票保持最大的上行凸性
I believe the asset classes poised to deliver the best risk-adjusted returns over the next 3-6 months are:
我相信未来3-6个月内有望提供最佳风险调整后回报的资产类别是：
International, value-oriented stock markets (e.g. Europe, Japan, Canada, specific Emerging Markets);
国际价值导向型股票市场（例如欧洲、日本、加拿大、特定新兴市场）；
Precious metals and industrial commodities (e.g. Copper).
贵金属和工业大宗商品（例如铜）。
This was it for today. Thanks for reading.
今天就到这里。感谢阅读。
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