【文章标题】：European Commission Revives Push for Encryption Backdoors in ProtectEU Strategy
【文章标题】：欧盟委员会借”保护欧洲”战略重启加密后门计划
【文章正文】：
The EU is once again looking for a way to undermine end-to-end encryption in the name of strengthening law enforcement capabilities, this time via a new strategy, ProtectEU.
欧盟再次以强化执法能力为名，试图破坏端到端加密技术——这次是通过名为”保护欧洲”的新战略。
The internal security strategy, announced this week by the EU Commission, is presented as a “vision and workplan” that will span a number of years but stops short of making concrete policy proposals.
欧盟委员会本周公布的内部安全战略被定位为一项”愿景与工作计划”，虽规划多年实施但未提出具体政策建议。
A press release asserts that the current geopolitical environment is one of “growing” threats from hostile states, and mentions powerful criminal groups and terrorists who are “operating increasingly online” – as well as “surging cybercrime and attacks against our critical infrastructure.”
新闻稿宣称当前地缘政治环境中”日益增长”的敌对国家威胁，并提及”日益转向线上运作”的强大犯罪集团和恐怖分子，以及”激增的网络犯罪和针对关键基础设施的攻击”。
With the threat elements defined in this way, the EU’s new strategy focuses on six areas, one of them being “more effective tools for law enforcement” – which is where online encryption comes under attack.
基于如此界定的威胁要素，欧盟新战略聚焦六大领域，其中”更有效的执法工具”正是线上加密技术遭受攻讦的领域。
When it describes how the groundwork might be laid for mandating encryption backdoors, the EU chooses to use euphemisms such as creating roadmaps for “lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement” and seeking “technological solutions for accessing encrypted data.”
在描述如何为强制加密后门奠定基础时，欧盟选择使用委婉措辞，比如制定”执法部门合法有效获取数据的路线图”，寻求”访问加密数据的技术解决方案”。
A technology roadmap on encryption would allow for these “solutions” to be found. The EU is not alone in searching for mechanisms to, eventually, legislate against encryption, but these initiatives are invariably met with warnings from both tech companies and civil rights and privacy advocates.
加密技术路线图将使这些”解决方案”成为可能。欧盟并非唯一试图最终立法反对加密的实体，但这类倡议总会招致科技公司与民权隐私倡导者的警告。
The key issue is that encryption provides both for private communications (which is what law enforcement wants access to) and also the technical security of those communications, financial transactions, etc.
关键在于加密技术既保障私人通讯（这正是执法部门想要获取的），也保障这些通讯和金融交易等的技术安全性。
The new EU strategy promises that cybersecurity and fundamental rights will be protected as a future encryption backdoor is implemented.
新欧盟战略承诺在实施加密后门时将保护网络安全与基本权利。
But this is not a promise anyone can make, considering that once there, a backdoor is effectively available to all actors, including those hostile states and non-state actors the EU purports its strategy is there to protect against.
但这绝非可兑现的承诺——因为后门一旦存在，所有行为体（包括欧盟宣称要防范的敌对国家与非国家行为体）都能实际利用。
Other prominent points contained in ProtectEU include increased intelligence sharing between member countries and the bloc’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) – as a way to “anticipate” security threats.
”保护欧洲”战略的其他要点包括加强成员国间情报共享与欧盟单一情报分析能力（SIAC），以此”预判”安全威胁。
Yet another centralization effort is the idea to give EU’s law enforcement agency EUROPOL more powers, including around cross-border and large-scale investigations, in the process making it “a truly operational police agency.”
另一项集权化举措是赋予欧盟执法机构欧洲刑警组织更多权力，包括跨境和大规模调查权限，使其成为”真正可运作的警察机构”。
This is followed by reassuring member countries that the purpose is to “reinforce support” to them.
文件随后向成员国保证，此举旨在为它们”强化支持”。